

IOTLB-SC: An Accelerator-Independent Leakage Source in Modern Cloud Systems

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UNIVERSITÄT ZU LÜBECK
INSTITUTE FOR IT SECURITY



WPI

Motivation

IOTLB
Side-channels

Eviction Sets

Threat Model


Case Study

Covert Channels

Countermeasures

Conclusion

Motivation



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
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
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
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
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Research Question

Do IOTLBs introduce a side-channel?

IOTLB Side-channels

Problem

- ▶ IOMMU inaccessible from CPU

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IOTLB Side-channels

Problem

- ▶ IOMMU inaccessible from CPU
- ▶ **Solution:** FPGA design to carry out our experiments

IOTLB Side-channels

Results

IOMMU disabled

- ▶ DMA read: 160–185 cycles

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IOMMU enabled

- ▶ First DMA read: 225–270 cycles

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IOMMU enabled

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- ▶ DMA read: 160–185 cycles

IOMMU enabled

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65–85 cycles difference between IOTLB hit and miss

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
Eviction Sets

Prime+Probe

Attacker



Cache



Victim



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
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
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
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
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Eviction Sets

Algorithms

Grow-Split [Liu]

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? Number of ways per cache set

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We combine both algorithms to not require prior knowledge.


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Eviction Sets

Grow-Reduce Algorithm


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// Grow
while count < 50 do
  page ←ε pool
  evset ←+ page
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  if evicts(target, evset) then
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Eviction Sets

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Evaluation

Flush	Algorithm	Sets	Set size	Useful sets per target	Average best eviction rate
✓	Grow-Split [Liu]	1.00	118.00	1.00	100.00 %
	Grow-Reduce	1.00	118.00	1.00	100.00 %
✗	Grow-Split [Liu]	10.70	50.69	0.98	28.00 %
	Grow-Reduce	32.08	110.05	0.98	82.23 %

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
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
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
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No SQL-query




SQL-query



Eviction Set Address

Covert Channels

PCIe ↔ PCIe



IOTLB-SC

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Covert Channels

CPU → PCIe

- ▶ Requires ring 0 privileges

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CPU → PCIe

- ▶ Requires ring 0 privileges
- ▶ Flush+Reload

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CPU → PCIe

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How about the reverse direction?

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CPU → PCIe

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How about the reverse direction?

- ▶ Asynchronous IOTLB flush

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CPU → PCIe

- ▶ Requires ring 0 privileges
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How about the reverse direction?

- ▶ Asynchronous IOTLB flush
- ▶ Flush execution time is *not* data-dependent

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CPU → PCIe

- ▶ Requires ring 0 privileges
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How about the reverse direction?

- ▶ Asynchronous IOTLB flush
- ▶ Flush execution time is *not* data-dependent
- ▶ No PCIe → CPU

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Channel	Method	Env	Throughput	Error	Message content
PCIe → PCIe	P+P	Host	3.4 bps	0%	All 1s
			6.65 bps	0%	50/50
			246.15 bps	0.1%	All 0s
			7.58 bps	0%	ASCII
CPU → PCIe	F+R	Host	15023 bps	30.09%	

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- ▶ Constant-time code

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Hypervisor

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- ▶ Constant-time code

Hypervisor

-  Address Translation Services

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Hardware

- ▶ Way-based IOTLB partitioning
- ▶ Un-cacheable translations

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- ▶ Previously ignored side-channel for DMA-capable devices identified

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Thank you for your attention!