

Spectre Declassified: Reading from the Right Place at the Wrong Time

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Background



Background



Motivating Example

```
key = ...  
state = message  
for (i from 0 to 8) {  
    bit = 1 << i  
    if (key & bit) { state ^= bit }  
}
```

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```

Applies a one-time-pad
one bit a time

Motivating Example

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
Branches on key material

Applies a one-time-pad
one bit a time

Background



Background



Constant-Time Programming

- Prevents Secret-Dependent
 - Memory Accesses
 - Control Flow
 - Instruction Timings

Motivating Example

```
key = ...  
state = message  
for (i from 0 to 8) {  
    bit = 1 << i  
    state ^= (key & bit)  
}
```

No longer uses a branch

Motivating Example

```
secret key = ...  
secret state = message  
for (i from 0 to 8) {  
    public bit = 1 << i  
    state ^= (key & bit)  
}
```

Motivating Example

```
secret key = ...
secret state = message
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Motivating Example

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secret key = ...
secret state = message
for (i from 0 to 8) {
    public bit = 1 << i
    state ^= (key & bit)
}
```

Flow of Values

Public-Typed Values

Secret-Typed Values

Don't care

Constant Time

Outside World

Declassification

```
secret key = ...
secret state = message
for (i from 0 to 8) {
    public bit = 1 << i
    state ^= (key & bit)
}
```

Declassification

```
secret key = ...
secret state = message
for (i from 0 to 8) {
    public bit = 1 << i
    state ^= (key & bit)
}
public ciphertext = state
```

Declassification

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Declassification

```
secret key = ...
secret state = message
for (i from 0 to 8) {
    public bit = 1 << i
    state ^= (key & bit)
}
public ciphertext = declassify(state)
```

Flow of Values

Public-Typed Values



Secret-Typed Values




Constant Time





Outside World

Flow of Values



Flow of Values





SPECTRE

Spectre Variant 1

```
if (index < array.length) {  
  
    public value = array[index]  
    leak(value)  
  
}
```

Spectre Variant 1

Body executed even if condition is false

```
if (index < array.length) {
```

```
    public value = array[index]
```

```
    leak(value)
```



```
}
```

Spectre Variant 1

Body executed even if condition is false

```
if (index < array.length) {
```

Could load a secret

```
    public value = array[index]
```

```
    Leak(value) 
```

```
}
```

Spectre Variant 1

Body executed even if condition is false

```
if (index < array.length) {
```

Can leak


Could load a secret

```
public value = array[index]
```


```
leak(value) 
```

```
}
```

Flow of Values



Flow of Values



Speculative Load Hardening (SLH)

- Compiler instruments program
- Detects misspeculation
- Poisons loaded values under misspeculation

Speculative Load Hardening (SLH)

```
if (index < array.length) {  
    public value = array[index]  
    leak(value)  
}
```

Speculative Load Hardening (SLH)

```
mask = 0
```

```
if (index < array.length) {
```


```
    mask = index < array.length ? mask : -1
```

```
    public value = array[index] | mask
```


```
    leak(value)
```

```
}
```

Flow of Values



Flow of Values



Speculative Declassification

```
secret key = ...
secret state = message
for (i from 0 to 8) {
    public bit = 1 << i
    state ^= (key & bit)
}
public ciphertext = declassify(state)
```

Speculative Declassification

```
secret key = ...  
secret state = message  
for (i from 0 to 8) {  
    public bit = 1 << i  
    state ^= (key & bit)  
}  
public ciphertext = declassify(state)
```

Skipped



Speculative Declassification

```
secret key = ...  
secret state = message  
for (i from 0 to 8) {  
    public bit = 1 << i  
    state ^= (key & bit)  
}  
public ciphertext = declassify(state)
```

Skipped



Unencrypted

Speculative Declassification

```
secret key = ...  
secret state = message  
for (i from 0 to 8) {  
    public bit = 1 << i  
    state ^= (key & bit)  
}  
public ciphertext = declassify(state)
```

Skipped




Unencrypted




Flow of Values

Speculative declassify



Flow of Values



Real-World Example

```
secret state = plaintext
state = aes_round(state, *key++)
    ...
state = aes_round(state, *key++)
if (rounds == 12) {
    ...
}
state = aes_last_round(state, *key++)
public ciphertext = declassify(state)
```

Real-World Example

```
secret state = plaintext
state = aes_round(state, *key++)
...
state = aes_round(state, *key++)
if (rounds == 12) {
    ...
}
state = aes_last_round(state, *key++)
public ciphertext = declassify(state)
```

Skipped



Real-World Example

```
secret state = plaintext
state = aes_round(state, *key++)
...
state = aes_round(state, *key++)
if (rounds == 12) {
  ...
}
state = aes_last_round(state, *key++)
public ciphertext = declassify(state)
```

Skipped



Incorrectly encrypted

Real-World Example

```
secret state = plaintext
state = aes_round(state, *key++)
...
state = aes_round(state, *key++)
if (rounds == 12) {
  ...
}
state = aes_last_round(state, *key++)
public ciphertext = declassify(state)
```

Skipped



Incorrectly encrypted

Countermeasure

```
secret key = ...
secret state = message
for (i from 0 to 8) {
    public bit = 1 << i
    state ^= (key & bit)
}
public ciphertext = declassify(state)
```

Countermeasure

```
secret key = ...
secret state = message
for (i from 0 to 8) {
    public bit = 1 << i
    state ^= (key & bit)
}
public ciphertext = declassify(state)
```

Insert speculation fence


Countermeasure

Earlier instructions
must execute correctly


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Insert speculation fence


Flow of Values



Flow of Values



Performance Impact



Selective SLH

```
if (index < array.length) {  
  
    ...  
    public value = array[index]  
    ...  
    leak(value)  
  
}
```

Selective SLH

```
mask = 0
if (index < array.length) {
    mask = index < array.length ? mask : -1
    ...
    public value = array[index] | mask
    ...
    leak(value)
}
```

Selective SLH

```
mask = 0
if (index < array.length) {
  mask = index < array.length ? mask : -1
  ...
  secret value = array[index] | mask
  ...
  leak(value)
}
```

Selective SLH

```
mask = 0
if (index < array.length) {
  mask = index < array.length ? mask : -1
  ...
  secret value = array[index] | mask
  ...
  leak(value)
}
```

Selective SLH

```
mask = 0
```

```
if (index < array.length) {
```

```
    mask = index < array.length ? mask : -1
```

```
    ...
```

Out of bounds access

```
    secret value = array[index] | mask
```

```
    ...
```

```
    leak(value)
```

```
}
```

Selective SLH

```
mask = 0
```

```
if (index < array.length) {
```

```
    mask = index < array.length ? mask : -1
```

```
    ...
```

Out of bounds access

```
    secret value = array[index] + mask
```

```
    ...
```

```
    leak(value)
```

```
}
```

Selective SLH

```
public array[]  
  
if (index < array.length) {  
  
    ...  
    public value = array[index]  
    ...  
    leak(value)  
}
```

Selective SLH

```
public array[]
```

```
mask = 0
```

```
if (index < array.length) {
```

```
    mask = index < array.length ? mask : -1
```

```
    ...
```

```
    public value = array[index] | mask
```

```
    ...
```

```
    leak(value)
```

```
}
```

What if (public) array
never leaks?

Selective SLH

```
secret array[]  
  
if (index < array.length) {  
    ...  
    secret value = array[index]  
    ...  
    leak(value)  
}
```

Tagging public values that do not leak as secret reduces overhead!!!

Selective SLH

Algorithm	SLH Masking Removed
ChaCha20 (1024B)	~80%
Donna-c64	~95%

Summary

- Declassification requires protections
- SLH + fence has negligible performance impact
- Selective SLH significantly reduces overhead
- See the paper for more details:
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/426>